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Hinton v. Hinton: Equitable Distribution Without
Consideration Of Marital Fault
In 1981 North Carolina modernized its laws on the distribution of property
upon divorce.1 The adoption of North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20
changed North Carolina law from the common-law approach, in which property
division focused primarily on legal title,2 to an equitable distribution system, in
which marriage is viewed as an economic partnership.3 This change brought
North Carolina in line with most other jurisdictions4 and generally has been
seen as desirable, 5 but it also left unanswered questions. For example, if a hus-
band beats his wife, or if a wife abandons her husband, should a court consider
such conduct in distributing the couple's property on divorce?
In Hinton v. Hinton6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed for
the first time whether marital fault should be a consideration in equitable distri-
bution. The court concluded that marital fault is irrelevant in making an equita-
ble distribution of property.7 This Note examines the implications of the court's
decision and concludes that, although marital fault generally should not be a
consideration, other types of fault may be relevant in equitable distribution. If
confronted with this issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court should reach the
same holding as the Hinton court, but also should recognize those situations in
which fault may be relevant.
The parties in Hinton filed for equitable distribution of their property under
section 50-20.8 The trial court awarded a greater share of the property to the
wife, partly because the husband had physically abused the wife throughout
their marriage. 9 Among other incidents of abuse,10 the husband had struck his
wife, causing a detached retina and scarring the tissue of her eye.1 I At the time
1. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. SEss. LAWS 1184 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20 (1984)).
2. Marschall, Proposed Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 45
(1976); see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
3. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61
N.C.L. REv. 247, 247 (1983); see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
4. There are at least forty-one states with equitable distribution systems. Freed & Foster,
Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 379 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 3; Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-Family
Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1379, 1396 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
6. 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 666, 321 S.E.2d at 161-62.
9. Id. at 666, 321 S.E.2d at 162.
10. The evidence showed that the husband was argumentative, threatened his wife, repeatedly
physically abused her, chased her around the house with a loaded shotgun and told her he was going
to blow her head off, held a loaded shotgun to his wife's head for 30 minutes and told her to "say
your prayers because it will be the last time you see daylight," beat her with his shoe, ripped the
phone out of the wall and chased her with a butcher knife, beat one of their daughters, spanked his
wife over his knee, and contracted venereal disease and gave it to his wife. Id. at 670-71, 321 S.E.2d
at 164.
11. Id.
of trial, these injuries still impaired her ability to work. 12 The trial court found
that an equal distribution of property would not be equitable, 13 citing as one
reason that "injuries from the beatings. . have affected her employability.',
14
On appeal, the court interpreted this finding to mean that "because it is the
husband's fault that his wife's future earning ability is limited, his share of the
marital property should be reduced."' 15 Although it is questionable whether the
trial court's distribution actually reflected fault considerations,' 6 the court of
appeals used Hinton as a vehicle to consider the relevance of fault under North
Carolina's equitable distribution statute.
In rejecting fault as a consideration, the court of appeals examined the ap-
proach taken in other states, particularly New York,17 and focused on the poli-
cies and legislative intent behind North Carolina's statute. Other jurisdictions
take varying approaches to the issue of fault in equitable distribution. Some
states expressly include fault as a relevant consideration in their statutes; others
reject it.18 In states with statutes that do not expressly mention fault, courts
have reached different conclusions on whether to consider fault in the distribu-
tion of property. 19
In Hinton the court began its discussion by stating that the North Carolina
equitable distribution statute was enacted to recognize marriage as an economic
partnership.20 The purpose of equitable distribution is to effect "a return to each
party of that which he or she contributed to the marriage." 2 ' The court dis-
cussed the difficulty in determining fault 22 and expressed its view that considera-
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
14. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 671, 321 S.E.2d at 164. The court also based its conclusion that an
equal distribution would not be equitable on the disparity in the parties' incomes, the duration of the
marriage, the disparity between their retirement rights, and the wife's indirect contribution to the
husband's career potential. Id.
15. Id. at 672, 321 S.E.2d at 165.
16. Judge Becton, in his dissent, contended that the trial court's decision was not based on
fault. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
17. The court's reliance on New York's approach was appropriate because North Carolina's
equitable distribution statute closely resembles and was modeled after the New York statute. See
Survey, supra note 5, at 1399; infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussion of similarities
between the two statutes). The court paid particular attention to a recent New York decision, Blick-
stein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984). See infra notes 51-56 and accompany-
ing text.
18. See Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162. The court lists the following state
statutes as among those that expressly include fault: CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(c) (West
1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.1(4) (Vernon
1984). The following statutes expressly exclude fault from consideration: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1513(a) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.40, § 503(d) (Smith-Hurd 1984); MIm. STAT. ANN. § 518.58
(West 1984). Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162. Fault is a factor to be considered at
the trial court's discretion in at least two states: ALA. CODE § 30-2-52 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §751 (Equity 1984). See also infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussion of different
states' approaches to consideration of fault).
19. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162; see also infra note 59 (list of representative
state decisions); infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (diesussion of different states' approaches
to consideration of fault).
20. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 668, 321 S.E.2d at 163.
21. Id. at 669, 321 S.E.2d at 163.
22. Id.
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tion of fault serves only one purpose-punishment of the "guilty" spouse by the
courts. 23 The court asserted that the general assembly did not intend the statute
to fulfill this purpose. 24 Last, the court considered the relationship between the
equitable distribution statute and other North Carolina divorce statutes. The
general assembly has instituted "no fault" divorce.25 Fault, however, is a rele-
vant consideration in awarding alimony.26 These facts led the court to conclude
that the general assembly intended fault to be considered in making alimony
awards, but not in equitable distribution.27
The policies underlying North Carolina's equitable distribution statute and
the cases cited in Hinton support the conclusion that marital fault28 is not an
appropriate consideration under the statute. Although equitable distribution
should not be based on marital fault, other types of fault should be considered.
29
An examination of the North Carolina statute and the approach taken in other
jurisdictions will illuminate this distinction.
The North Carolina equitable distribution statute30 provides that on di-
vorce, the court shall make an equitable distribution 31 of a couple's marital
property.32 The court must make an equal division33 of marital property unless
it determines that an equal distribution would not be equitable.34 The court
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (provides for divorce based on one-year separation without
showing that plaintiff is injured party).
26. See infra note 31.
27. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 670, 321 S.E.2d at 164.
28. The term "fault" is used here to refer to conduct leading to the dissolution of the marriage.
Economic fault, usually consisting of dissipating joint assets, involves different considerations and is
discussed infra in notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984).
31. The distribution of property on divorce differs from the awarding of alimony. Property
distribution is a one-time division of marital assets between husband and wife; alimony involves
ongoing payments from one spouse to the other. In North Carolina, alimony is paid to a dependent
spouse by a supporting spouse, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1984), and is awarded only if the sup-
porting spouse has committed one of the wrongs listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984). Two
of the grounds for alimony are particularly relevant to the Hinton case: "The supporting spouse by
cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of the dependent spouse [and] [t]he supporting
spouse offers such indignities to the person of the dependent spouse as to render his or her condition
intolerable and life burdensome." Id. § 50-16.2 (6), (7).
Misconduct by the dependent spouse prevents him or her from receiving alimony. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.5 (1984). Thus, in North Carolina alimony awards clearly are fault-based. See Wil-
liams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 188, 261 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1980) (general assembly intended that
fault be a factor in alimony awards).
32. Only marital property is subject to distribution-separate property is excluded. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1984). The definition of marital property in North Carolina is relatively narrow;
thus, the reach of the statute is less extensive than that of other states' statutes. See Sharp, supra
note 3, at 253. For an example of the effect of this provision, see Crumbley v. Crumbley, 70 N.C.
App. 143, 318 S.E.2d 525 (1984) (lot held to be husband's separate property even though deeded to
husband and wife, because it was received by husband from his mother in exchange for a separately
owned lot conveyed earlier to his mother).
33. See Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 552, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1985) (statute
creates presumption of equal division "in the absence of some reason(s) compelling a contrary re-
sult"); White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 435, 308 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1983) (statute creates presumption
of equal division), aff'd as modified, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984).
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must consider specific factors in determining what division is equitable.35 The
final listed factor is a "catch-all" provision,36 which permits consideration of
"[a]ny other factor which the court finds to be just and proper."'37 It is under
this factor that fault could be considered.
38
The significance of the court of appeals' decision not to consider fault is
apparent only when the decision is contrasted with the fault-ridden backdrop of
earlier divorce law.39 Before the adoption of section 50-20, North Carolina
courts distributed property on divorce under the common-law system. Under
this system, property followed legal title on divorce, unless a constructive trust
or gift could be established.40 This approach produced inequitable results when
one spouse had performed housekeeping and child-rearing services, but property
was held in the name of the other spouse.4 1 To remedy this inequity42 and to
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984) lists the following factors:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property
is to become effective;
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage;
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both
parties;
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy or
own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;
(5) Vested pension or retirement rights and the expectation of nonvested pension or retire-
ment rights, which are separate property;
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acqui-
sition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or ex-
penditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner
or homemaker;
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the
career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs dur-
ing the course of the marriage;
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corpo-
ration or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest, intact
and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(11) The tax consequences to each party; and
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
36. See Survey, supra note 5, at 1399.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (1984).
38. See Survey, supra note 5, at 1403-07 (pre-Hinton discussion of whether North Carolina
courts would be likely to consider fault under catch-all factor).
39. For a discussion of the role of fault in North Carolina family law, see Marschall, supra note
2, at 38-39; Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State,
59 N.C.L. REv. 819, 822-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Divorce]. But cf. Sharp, Fairness Standards
and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399,
1454-55 (1984) (suggesting that the role of fault in alimony awards and property distribution may
have been overestimated).
40. Marschall, supra note 2, at 45; Survey, supra note 5, at 1396 (property follows title on
divorce).
41. See Marschall, supra note 2, at 45; Sharp, supra note 3, at 247; Survey, supra note 5, at
1396; see also Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 23 UCLA L. Rv. 1181, 1241-53 (1980-81) (demonstrating
empirically that men are financially better-off than women after divorce).
42. The North Carolina Court of Appeals stated in White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 433, 308
S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983) that "[e]quitable distribution. . . gives recognition to the essential supportive
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recognize marriage as an economic partnership,4 3 the general assembly enacted
section 50-20.44 Under this statute, marital property is distributed equitably
upon divorce based on factors enumerated in the statute,45 which do not include
marital fault. In contrast, fault is crucial in determining alimony awards; a de-
pendent spouse is entitled to alimony only if the supporting spouse is "guilty"
and the dependent spouse is "innocent."
'46
The North Carolina General Assembly borrowed heavily from New York's
equitable distribution statute,47 therefore, an examination of that state's statute
is helpful. 48 The New York statute was enacted in 1980 to reflect the "modem
view of marriage as a partnership of equals and of divorce as the dissolution of
such a partnership."' 49 The New York equitable distribution statute contains a
catch-all provision almost identical to North Carolina's, which allows considera-
tion of "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.'"so In Blickstein v. Blickstein5 l , a recent New York case relied on by the
role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and mother she should
clearly be entitled to a share of the assets accumulated during the marriage."
Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court has described § 50-20 as part of "the ongoing
march of the law to place men and women generally and husbands and wives particularly on an
equal legal footing." Mims v. Mirns, 305 N.C. 41, 56, 286 S.E.2d 779, 789 (1982). But cf. Prager,
Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2 (1977-78) (sug-
gesting that "the marital property policy debate has become distorted by the focus on equality" and
emphasizing the importance of "sharing behavior" in marriage).
43. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 668, 321 S.E.2d at 163; White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 432,
308 S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983).
44. Since § 50-20 was enacted, the North Carolina courts have resolved many controversies in
connection with the statute in addition to the fault issue. The statute has survived a charge of
unconstitutional vagueness. Ellis v. Ellis, 68 N.C. App. 634, 315 S.E.2d 526 (1984). Also, the courts
have determined that the statute does not affect the validity of separation agreements, McArthur v.
McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484, 315 S.E.2d 344 (1984), although it does permit parties to execute a
property settlement without a separation. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97
(1984). Furthermore, a valid property settlement precludes the parties from requesting equitable
distribution of their property. Id. In addition, the court of of appeals has determined that equitable
distribution must occur before alimony and child support are awarded. Capps v. Capps, 69 N.C.
App. 755, 318 S.E.2d 346 (1984).
It is clear that only marital property is subject to equitable distribution. The court must deter-
mine what the marital property is, ascertain its net value, and then proceed with the distribution.
Turner v. Turner, 64 N.C. App. 342, 307 S.E.2d 407 (1983). If the trial court concludes that an
equal distribution is not equitable, it is required to enter findings of fact to support its conclusion.
The trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal unless it has resulted in "an obvious miscar-
riage of justice." Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 552, 315 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1984).
45. See supra note 35.
46. See supra note 31.
47. North Carolina was relatively late in enacting its equitable distribution statute. See Mar-
schall, supra note 2, at 45 (at the time of enactment, only fourteen United States jurisdictions, in-
cluding North Carolina, still adhered to common-law marital property systems). See also Freed &
Foster, supra note 4, at 379 (at least forty-one states have equitable distribution systems).
48. See supra note 17.
49. Recent Developments-Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 ALB. L. REV. 483, 488
(1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]; see also Forcucci v. Forcucci, 83 A.D.2d 169,
171, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (1981) (statute enacted as a result of realization that marriage is an
economic partnership).
50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985). This provision was
controversial. Opponents of the statute thought the catch-all factor gave the courts too much lati-
tude. Recent Developments, supra note 49, at 504. The factor apparently was included, both in the
New York and North Carolina statutes, as a compromise between those who wanted fault to be
considered and those who did not. Survey, supra note 5, at 1403 n.191. See Recent Developments,
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court in Hinton, the New York Supreme Court determined that marital fault
generally is not a relevant factor under the statute.5 2 The court's holding was
based on its view of marriage as an economic partnership and on the idea that
upon dissolution of the partnership, property should be distributed according to
economic need.5 3 In addition, the court reasoned that fault may be difficult to
evaluate and that both parties actually may be responsible for the breakup of a
marriage.5 4 The court did note, however, that fault may be relevant in ex-
traordinary situations-those in which marital misconduct "shocks the con-
science."'5 5 The court also stated that economic fault-in most cases dissipation
of assets-is a relevant consideration.
5 6
Legislative and judicial resolutions of the fault issue in other jurisdictions
further illustrate the policy considerations in this area. The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act expressly precludes consideration of fault in distribution of
property.5 7 Some states have enacted statutes providing that fault may not be
considered, whereas others have statutes listing fault as a factor that must be
considered.5 8 Still other states' statutes do not mention fault; in these states the
supra note 49, at 506 n.116, for a discussion of the omission of fault from the New York statute
(commentary was written prior to any New York court decisions on the fault issue).
51. 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984).
52. Id. Before Blickstein, lower courts in New York had reached varying conclusions on
whether fault was a proper consideration in equitable distribution of marital property. In Giannola
v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1981), the court held that marital fault,
consisting of alleged adultery, constructive abandonment, and cruel and inhuman treatment by the
husband, was relevant to equitable distribution. The court held, however, that marital fault would
not preclude an award of equitable distribution. Id. at 987, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
This approach was developed further in Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 442 N.Y.S.2d
392 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified on other grounds, 96 A.D.2d 831, 465 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1983) (mem.),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d 399, 477 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1984). The Kobylack court
agreed with the Giannola court that fault is a proper consideration, but found it not relevant in the
case before it because the assets could be equitably distributed without economic harm to either
party. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d at 408, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 395. The Kobylack court set forth the
general rule that "fault should not be used as a punishment but only as a consideration to tilt the
balance where there are insufficient assets to make the parties economically 'whole."' Id.
In a later decision, M.V.R. v. T.M.R., 115 Misc. 2d 674, 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1982),
another trial court concluded that fault (in this case the husband's alleged homosexuality) should not
be considered in equitable distribution of marital assets. The court based its holding on an analogy
to dissolution of a commercial partnership, in which fault is irrelevant, id. at 678, 454 N.Y.S.2d at
782, on the difficulty in determining marital fault, id. at 679, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 782, and on the
potential for discrimination by the courts (against homosexuals in this case and against women in
other cases). Id. at 680, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
53. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d at 291, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
54. Id. at 292, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
55. Id. at 292, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14; see infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
56. Id. at 293, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 114; see supra note 28; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
57. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 201 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) § 307 (1974). This
section contains two alternatives. Alternative A provides that "the court, without regard to marital
misconduct, shall... equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to
either or both. . . ." Alternative B states that the court "shall divide community property, without
regard to marital misconduct, in just proportions. Both alternatives list factors for the court
to consider in making the distribution. Id.
The New York statute was modeled on Alternative A. Recent Developments, supra note 49, at
492. The language regarding marital misconduct, however, was omitted. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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courts have decided whether fault should be considered.5 9 New Jersey's equita-
ble distribution statute, for example, does not address the question of fault.60 In
the landmark case of Chalmers v. Chalmers61 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that marital fault could not be considered in equitable distribution.62 The
court based its decision on the difficulty of assessing fault, noting that "fault may
be merely a manifestation of a sick marriage." 63 In addition, the court found
the concept of fault irrelevant in equitable distribution "since all that is being
effected is the allocation to each party of what really belongs to him or her."
64
The Hinton court's holding appears to reflect properly the policies underly-
ing equitable distribution. If the purpose of equitable distribution is to effect the
dissolution of an economic partnership, marital fault is irrelevant. Misconduct
that leads to divorce may not be related to the economic contributions of the
parties or to their financial needs after divorce.
65
If the court does consider marital fault, it faces the difficult task of deter-
mining which spouse's conduct precipitated the collapse of the marriage.
66
Some courts have taken the position that fault is relevant, but when both spouses
are equally at fault, the parties' misconduct will be disregarded. 67 This position
affords a partial solution to the problem of assessing fault. On the other hand,
courts may not wish to inquire into marital fault at all to avoid the
melancholy history of feigned grounds, strident name-calling and fin-
ger-pointing and mutually destructive charges of crime and miscon-
duct which have turned our courts all too often into battle grounds in
which reputations are destroyed along with marriages, and children
are made spectators to mutual character-assassination by their
parents.
6 8
Refusal to consider fault on dissolution, however, may have drawbacks.
The court in Hinton pointed out that the trial court might reach the same result
59. Representative state decisions include: Cooper v. Cooper, 382 So. 2d 569 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980) (fault relevant despite availability of no-fault divorce); Peters v. Peters, 248 Ga. 490, 283
S.E.2d 454 (1981) (adultery relevant but will not preclude equitable distribution); In re Marriage of
Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (fault irrelevant under catch-all provision); LaRue v. LaRue,
216 Kan. 242, 531 P.2d 84 (1975) (fault relevant); Davey v. Davey, 106 Mich. App. 579, 308
N.W.2d 468 (1981) (fault relevant despite availability of no-fault divorce); Simmons v. Simmons, 275
S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980) (adultery relevant but will not preclude equitable distribution);
Thorpe v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 321 N.W.2d 237 (1982) (fault not proper consideration under
catch-all factor of equitable distribution statute).
60. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1985).
61. 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
62. Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 194, 320 A.2d at 483.
65. Sharp, Divorce supra note 39, at 825 n.30.
66. See supra notes 22, 54 & 63 and accompanying text.
67. See Nolen v. Nolen, 398 So. 2d 712, 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259
N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D.), appeal after remand, 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1977).
68. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 46-47 (N.D.), appeal after remand, 281 N.W.2d 569
(N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting). Justice Vogel pointed out that the purpose of no-fault divorce
was to end this "melancholy history," but that the purpose is not achieved if fault enters as a consid-
eration in property division. Id. at 47 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
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on remand, but must support it with nonfault-related findings. 69 Given that
their orders will not be easily disturbed on appeal, 70 trial courts may continue to
be influenced by fault without expressing it as a factor in their findings. This
risk probably will be short lived, however, because over time courts are likely to
move away from a fault-oriented approach. Courts historically have considered
fault in all aspects of divorce,7 1 although recently the trend has been away from
fault considerations. 72 As courts confront more cases under the new laws and
become accustomed to making decisions without reference to fault, fault surely
will cease to be even an unconscious consideration. In addition, when alimony is
not an issue, fault-related evidence will be irrelevant and thus can be excluded
entirely.
A general rule against consideration of fault is consistent with the policies
behind equitable distribution. Such a rule allows courts to focus on the eco-
nomic situations of the parties rather than on the marital dispute itself. There
are circumstances, however, under which it would be inequitable not to consider
certain types of fault. In particular, fault may be relevant when one spouse has
dissipated joint assets, when one spouse has engaged in misconduct that de-
creases the earning capacity of the other spouse, and when marital fault is espe-
cially egregious.
Although marital fault usually does not involve the economic contributions
of the parties, sometimes the fault of one spouse consists of dissipation of marital
assets.73 Even if fault generally is not a relevant factor, economic fault should be
considered in equitable distribution. For example, in In re Marriage of Clark,74
the Washington Court of Appeals held that the husband's dissipation of much of
his earnings through drinking could be taken into account in distributing the
couple's property.
Misconduct by one spouse that affects the earning capacity of the other
spouse should be entitled to similar treatment. In Hinton the majority refused to
consider that the husband's abuse of his wife affected her ability to work, but
Judge Becton, in his dissent, found this fact relevant. 75 There clearly is a dis-
tinction between misconduct that leads to the dissolution of a marriage and mis-
69. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 672, 321 S.E.2d at 165.
70. Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 315 S.E.2d 772 (1984).
71. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 1-5, 39-46 and accompanying text.
73. The Blickstein court stated that such economic fault is a relevant consideration. Blickstein,
99 A.D.2d at 293, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
74. 13 Wash. App. 805, 538 P.2d 145 (1975). See also Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Vt. 249, 251,
373 A.2d 550, 552 (1977) (relevant that husband dissipated wife's inheritance).
75. Fault may not have been the appropriate issue on which to resolve Hinton. The court of
appeals probably was anxious to resolve the issue of fault in the equitable distribution context and
thus saw fault as an issue in Hinton when it really was not. Mrs. Hinton suffered from a detached
retina and scarring of the tissue in her left eye, which affected her ability to work. Hinton, 70 N.C.
App. at 670-71, 321 S.E.2d at 164. Thus, Judge Becton in his dissent interpreted the trial court's
determination as based on the wife's impaired employability and not on fault. Id. at 673, 321 S.E.2d
at 166 (Becton, J., dissenting). Judge Becton agreed with the majority that fault should not be
considered in equitable distribution, but stated that the fact that one spouse has diminished the
career potential of the other is a relevant consideration. Id. He pointed out that the statute specifi-
cally directs courts to consider the parties' relative economic positions, their physical and mental
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conduct that leaves a spouse disabled and unemployable. For instance, in an
Oregon case, the court found the fact that the husband had fractured his wife's
ankle relevant to the issue of her employability, but found that she was able to
work.76 Misconduct causing a physical disability that affects one spouse's ability
to work should be a proper consideration in equitable distribution and should be
distinguished from misconduct causing only the deterioration of the marriage.
Finally, in some cases the fault of one spouse may be so egregious that to
ignore it would be inequitable. For example, in D'Arc v. D'Arc77 a husband had
offered someone $50,000 to kill his wife, a wealthy heiress. In this case the court
relaxed the New Jersey rule against consideration of fault in equitable distribu-
tion78 to permit consideration of the husband's fault. The court noted that this
was not the usual type of fault, but an attempt to commit a heinous crime and
stated, "[W]here a spouse has committed an act that is so evil and outrageous
that it must shock the conscience of everyone, it is inconceivable that this court
should not consider his conduct when distributing the marital assets
equitably."
79
The adoption of equitable distribution represented a significant change in
North Carolina family law. To implement the policies of the equitable distribu-
tion statute fully, marital fault clearly cannot be considered in dividing a
couple's property on divorce. Equitable distribution is based on a view of mar-
riage as an economic partnership. The parties are entitled to recover what they
contributed to the marriage. In addition, the economic future of each spouse is
relevant. Fault, however, is not relevant to the dissolution of an economic part-
nership or to predicting the future needs of the parties. The decision of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hinton not to consider fault under North
Carolina's equitable distribution statute thus is both appropriate and consistent
with the purpose of the statute.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court is confronted with this issue, it
should reach the same result as the court of appeals, but should provide excep-
health, and any effort by one spouse to develop the career potential of the other spouse. Id. at 673,
321 S.E.2d at 165 (Becton, J., dissenting).
Any controversy over whether Hinton was the appropriate forum for deciding the role of fault
in equitable distribution has since been rendered moot. The court of appeals recently reaffirmed its
Hinton decision in a case presenting the issue more clearly. In Smith v. Smith, 71 N.C. App. 242,
322 S.E.2d 393 (1984), the wife had engaged in various forms of misconduct, including abandoning
her husband and children and drinking alcohol excessively. Id. at 245-46, 322 S.E.2d at 396. The
court reiterated its holding in Hinton: fault is not an appropriate consideration in determining an
equitable distribution of property. Id. at 249, 322 S.E.2d at 395; see also Dusenberry v. Dusenberry,
73 N.C. App. 177, 326 S.E.2d 65 (inappropriate to consider fault consisting of wife's adultery), disc.
rev. granted, 313 N.C. 598, 330 S.E.2d 608 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260
(evidence of misconduct properly excluded), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
76. In re Marriage of Koch, 58 Or. App. 252, 255, 648 P.2d 406, 408 (1982). But cf Myers v.
Myers, 586 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (fault is relevant, but husband's misconduct in
striking wife was too minor to affect property distribution).
77. 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (1978), modified on other grounds, 175 N.J. Super. 598,
421 A.2d 602 (1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
78. Id. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278; see supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
79. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278. The court in Blickstein used similar
language in stating that certain types of misconduct might be relevant. See supra text accompanying
note 55.
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tions to the general rule against consideration of fault in equitable distribution.
A spouse's misconduct that depletes the parties' joint assets should be consid-
ered. It would be inequitable to allow one spouse to waste the couple's assets
and then to share equally in the property on divorce. In addition, courts should
consider any physical disability affecting a spouse's earning capacity, regardless
of whether the disability was caused by the misconduct of the other spouse.
Finally, some types of misconduct are so egregious that a court would find it
difficult to ignore them, even if it were so inclined. Egregious fault thus should
be considered by courts making equitable distributions of marital property.
Although the court of appeals did not address these specific issues, the
broad policy expressed in Hinton is sound. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals helped fulfill the purpose of equitable distribution in holding that fault
should not enter into the court's division of marital property under section 50-
20. The courts now will be free to implement the true purposes of the statute-
equitable distribution of marital property based on the parties' contributions and
needs.
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